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I.  Introduction
Instruction on a massive array of topics covering nearly the entire panoply of econometric
technique. is widely available in textbooks and surveys.  There is, however, more to good empirical
work than technique:  There is the art of knowing what makes economic sense and of emphasizing
those clever ideas that will make the largest substantive contribution to one’s work.  My discussion
here makes no claim to technical originality.  Instead, its purpose is to provide younger applied
economists with a feel for what might be important, what to do and, perhaps most of all, what not
to do in empirical work.  While my examples stem almost exclusively from the literature of labor
economics, they also illustrate difficulties in empirical work in other subspecialties of economics and
in the statistical analysis of labor issues from the approaches of other disciplines.  All the discussion
presupposes the possibly subversive notion that analyzing data is a central part of applied economics
-- and of social science more generally.
Several underlying themes connect the wide-ranging discussion that follows.  Empirical
research in labor economics ideally focuses on the interpretation of behavior.  Discovering the facts --
cross-section and time-series patterns of wages and time use and their correlates, how various policies
affect labor-market outcomes, etc. -- is crucial.  But labor-market outcomes change remarkably
rapidly; and the Sgt. Friday approach to studying labor markets (“just the facts, Ma’am”) condemns
us to endlessly repeated reportage.  The best labormetric research documents outcomes but uses
economic theory to infer the behavior that generated them, allowing us to understand why the
outcomes change and to predict their paths.
The payoff to cleverness in labormetrics is huge.  The biggest rewards in our field have rightly
gone to those who have developed new approaches that solve old, often ill-perceived problems of2
inferring behavior from data.  Their innovations diffuse rapidly among other applied economists, often
too rapidly, for they are adopted because they are available, not because they are necessarily
appropriate.   The availability of a new technique is not its own justification; and those using it should
ask themselves whether their application is as appropriate as the original, or whether instead the
technique is just clouding the attempt to infer behavior.  Cleverness in labormetrics at least as often
involves using standard techniques in novel ways to increase our understanding of some economic
phenomenon.
Even before using sophisticated techniques it is crucial not to misapply what have become
fairly standard techniques.  In what follows I illustrate many of the admonitions about such
misapplications and misinterpretations with examples from the recent literature of empirical labor
economics and with new calculations based on a variety of sets of data.  I draw an embarrassingly
large number of these examples from my own research, not because that research is particularly
important, but because I am most familiar with it and with the data sets that underlay it.
II.  Data Cleanliness Ahead of Econometric Godliness
Before we worry about clever technique we must obtain data on which to exercise our
technique, generate estimates of impacts, and infer the behavior that caused them.  Too often we
mindlessly accept the data that are given to us as representing the economic concept that we seek to
include in our estimates.  We need to ask ourselves whether we have found the best available data
for the purpose and, more important, whether those data offer any hope of representing the concept.
If they do not, we must either collect our own data, or failing that revert to doing applied theory,
since we are deluding ourselves if we use such data for purposes of inferring behavior.  In research
on labor supply, for example, we have difficulties measuring the unearned income that is essential to3
identifying income effects; in studying labor demand the wage rates typically used are very far from
the full marginal cost of labor.
1  This is not a matter of classical measurement error, although I deal
with that later in this section.  Rather, the issue is whether we are able to match empirical proxies to
our theoretical constructs.
Another way in which we obviate our chances of answering our research question is by
restricting our samples so that they cannot answer the question.  Pick up any recent issue of a good
labor journal, or examine the labormetric articles in the top general journals, and consider whether
they meet this criterion.  For example, in a clever paper Baker (1997) examines the time-series
structure of men’s earnings, a crucial question for inferring the nature of earnings inequality.  Yet by
excluding from his 20-year sample all men who were not household heads or who did not work for
pay in each year he selected his sample in a highly nonrandom fashion.  In the same issue of the same
journal Shin (1997) is concerned about the relative importance of micro and macro shocks to
employment.  While he laudably bases the study on firm-level data, the restriction is to manufacturing
(which in the U.S. accounted for 15 percent of total employment and 17 percent of GDP in 1996).
Indeed, this “manucentrism” pervades the much-emulated research on idiosyncratic employment
changes (e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger 1992) and has given idiosyncratic impressions about the relative
importance of different sources of job growth and their differing cyclical variation.  Just because the
data are readily available does not mean that they will answer the research question we are studying.
Once we are satisfied that the data can at least hope to provide answers, the main issue
concerns measurement error of the sort:
(1) Xi t = X
*  i t + 2i t , i = 1,...,N ; t = 1,...,T ,4
where X
*  i t is the true measure, Xi t is what we observe, and 2i t is the error.  (Throughout this
discussion I will generalize and write both i and t subscripts, implying that we may have observations
on units at a point in time and on some or all of them over time.)  Here one cannot assume that E(2i
t) = 0.  That would not be a problem if this expectation were constant; but it need not be.  There are
cases where E(2i t) is changing, perhaps even trending in t; there are other cases where it is not
independent of which i we examine.
Consider the substantive problem that has probably occupied more labor economists’ efforts
than any other, namely the measurement and explanation of hours of work.  The concept we wish to
examine is the amount of some time interval (day, week, year, lifetime) devoted to market production.
Nearly all our research is based upon retrospective data, in which respondents to a survey are asked
to describe their activities in some past period.  Comparing such data to measures of market hours
from diaries that record actual time use (Juster and Stafford 1991), the former consistently
overerestimate work time.  Worse still, the overestimates differ with observed characteristics (differ
predictably across i).  Even more problematic, the differences across i suggest that the Et(2i t) may
also be trending, although the regrettable absence of repeated cross-sections of time diaries in most
countries makes direct inference impossible.  All of this means that our inferences about trends in
hours of market work and about the changing responsiveness of market work to prices and nonwage
incomes contain nonrandom errors whose direction may be known, but whose size is not.
Slightly longer-term problems of retrospection about time use are underscored when we try
to analyze spells of unemployment (Akerlof and Yellen 1985).  It seems clear that the quality of
recollections of unemployment deteriorates as they recede into the past, and this deterioration is
systematically related to the amount of unemployment experienced and to demographic5
characteristics.  The problem becomes even more severe with discrete events recollected many years
later.  The Displaced Worker Surveys, biennial supplements to the monthly U.S. Current Population
Surveys, ask workers whether they lost a job in the past five years, an event that respondents
apparently remember nonrandomly depending on its temporal distance and severity (Evans and
Leighton 1995).  The nonrandomness implies not only errors, but also biases to estimates of the
average effects of displacement on wages and other outcomes to the extent that the relationships are
nonlinear.
It is easy to bemoan the impacts of what one might call conceptual measurement error, but
we are still in the business of measuring as best we can.  When finding data that solve this problem
is impossible, we are obligated at the least to acknowledge it, to estimate its impacts on the
descriptive statistics of the phenomenon we are measuring, and to deduce the direction of the bias
that it imparts to the behavioral relationships we are estimating.
Our econometrics texts treat classical measurement error as God-given, something that is
there in the data and the implications of whose existence for our estimates must be inferred.  It is not.
In some cases we ignore measurement errors that, if simply noticed and cleaned, enhance the quality
of our results.  Data may be dirty, but in many cases the dirt is more like mud than Original Sin.  In
a study of the spending behavior in 1972-73 of 655 American households with some income from
unemployment insurance (UI), I estimated (Hamermesh 1982):
(2) Ct = 0.55UIt + 0.75YDt + ,t,
where the constant was insignificantly different from 0, and YD is the household’s other income.  An
unpublished estimate of the same model yielded a propensity to spend out of UI benefits of 0.15!  The
reason was simple, albeit not detected for some time:  In one of the households annual UI benefits6
were coded on the data tape as $22,184.  This outlier clearly resulted from an extra first digit.
2  The
moral of this anecdote is that one must check the descriptive statistics, especially the minima and
maxima, of all series prior to any estimation.
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In other cases we induce the measurement errors ourselves.  One (here unnamed) researcher
submitted a paper in which he estimated a log-earnings equation designed to infer the rate of return
to schooling.  The estimated return seemed unusually low.  It transpired that the author had
mistakenly assumed that the data source reported actual years of schooling, which was correct for
most observations; but for those for which data were unavailable education was coded as 99!  We
often unthinkingly create error-ridden data out of cleaner raw data, such as when we use as dependent
variables measures of wage rates constructed by dividing annual or weekly earnings by hours (Borjas
1980).
Other measurement errors arise from careless responses to surveys.  While these are neither
conceptual nor induced, their impacts on our estimates can be inferred, and in some cases the errors
can be reduced, if we can model and perhaps alter the behavior of the underlying agents whose
response are error-ridden (Philipson 1997).  Work in this area is just getting underway; but already
it should alert us that measurement error is not merely something to which we need only bow before
we proceed with estimation.  Physicians bury their medical mistakes in the ground.  We bury mistakes
in our data under a welter of econometric technique.  Neither group is honest about the extent of
deaths that are caused; but at least physicians can usually tell when their colleagues’ patients are dead.7
III.  Extreme Observations
Because of its assumption that the sum of squared errors is minimized to derive parameter
estimates, the Gauss-Markov theorem implies that we weight outliers very heavily.  The question is
whether the outliers are providing us with information or are merely the result of measurement errors.
If the former, least squares is a sensible way to infer impacts at sample averages (aside from being
convenient); if the latter, it is misleading, and we would get better estimates of the true relationship
if we chose a technique that avoided weighting outliers so heavily.  A variety of estimators of the "
in:
(3) Yi t = "Xi t + ,i t , 
are possible (Manski 1991), with minimizing the sum of the *,i* one common approach (equivalent
to estimating a regression line through the sample medians).  While one may have beliefs about
whether the theory applies at the means or the medians, the more typical concern is how much
information is conveyed by extreme observations.
Does this concern about outliers matter in practice?  Clearly it will matter most when one has
reason to believe that there are true outliers in the data (not outliers reflecting dirty data that we
created or failed to clean), perhaps as diagnosed by the descriptive statistics on the dependent
variable.  To examine the practical importance of this concern I take four data sets as examples, three
from my previous published research.  On the first two I present earnings regressions.  Part I of Table
1 reports LS (least squares) and LAD (least absolute deviations) estimates of a simple bivariate
equation relating the average salary of full professors of economics in 17 major public universities in
1996-97 to the average ranking of quality of the department.
4  Even in this very small sample the
estimates of the impact of reputation on average salary differ remarkably little between LS and LAD.8
This may be because the distribution around the mean is both fairly tight and more or less symmetric.
In Part II of Table 1 I reproduce from Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) the estimated impacts of
physical appearance, indicator variables denoting whether the respondent is in the bottom 15 percent
of physical appearance or the top 30 percent, on men’s earnings adjusted for a wide array of standard
variables.  Here too, but with much larger samples, the two approaches yield almost identical
estimates of the two crucial parameters, even though the range of Y is much larger relative to the
standard deviation than it was in the first example.
The third example explains weekly sleep time by a variety of demographic variables as well
as minutes of market work.  The LS estimates on this last variable are reported in Biddle and
Hamermesh (1990, Table 3, column 1) and reproduced in Part III of Table 1.  The final column in the
Table shows that the LAD estimates differ little from these LS estimates.  The last Part of Table 1
examines the effects of subjective life expectancy and unexpected years of life on the size of bequests
(data from Hamermesh and Menchik 1987).  The expected positive coefficient of the former (more
time to accumulate to satisfy a bequest motive) is almost identical with the two estimators, and the
expected negative, but insignificant coefficient of the latter is hardly altered by LAD.
These results suggest that the extreme weight that LS attaches to outliers does not greatly
affect the parameter estimates in an admittedly nonrandom sample of typical data sets of different
sizes and substantially different properties that seems typical of the kinds labormetricians use.  My
experience with other sets of data suggests the same thing.  No doubt, however, there are data sets
where this choice of technique may matter; and, since statistical packages have made it increasingly
easy to examine the sensitivity of one’s estimates to the least-squares assumption, checking out this9
possibility is a low-cost test of robustness.  In addition, examining the effects of influential
observations, perhaps by trimming the sample, is another good way to handle this potential problem.
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Without some loss function based in theory or policy concerns, the choice among LS, LAD
and other estimators has no basis in the economic behavior one is modeling, being purely a matter of
one’s beliefs about the informational content of outliers in the data.  The related issue, whether
underlying behavior differs at different points of the distribution of Y, is economic.  In some cases
we are just interested in discovering the impact of some RHS variable at different points of the
distribution of Y.  A typical case involves estimating wage equations where we wish to test whether
an institution or policy affects wages differently over their distribution.  For examples, where in the
distribution of wages is the wage gain from trade-union membership or from public-sector
employment greatest, adjusted for workers’ skills (Card 1996; Mueller 1997)?
In other cases the theory implies systematic differences in the ", making the use of quantile
regression an essential tool in hypothesis testing.  For example, one might believe that the labor of
recent immigrants is increasingly easily substituted for that of workers as we move down the level of
skill, both measurable and unmeasurable, with both presumably reflected in native workers’ wages
(Reimers 1998).  If we let Y be natives’ wages and let one component of X be the fraction of recent
immigrants in an area, we should expect " ^
q < " ^
q+1, where q is some quantile of the wage distribution.
Whether we are merely testing for variations in the impact of some X or have some behavioral
hypothesis that implies that the impact varies, there is generally no reason to assume that the " are
constant.  With more observations one can estimate the relationship at more quantiles.  (There is no
rule relating the number of quantiles to sample size; but I have found that having several hundred
observations per quantile is generally the minimum necessary to make this technique worth pursuing.)10
With larger data sets and low-cost methods of estimating quantile regressions, examining the
constancy of " over the distribution of Y makes sense.
While in many cases we are interested in the X6Y relationship over the range of Y, in others
we are interested in how the relationship is modified by variations in some other exogenous variable
Z.  For examples, the complementarity of formal and informal training leads us to expect “fanning-
out” in age-earnings profiles, and we can test this by interacting a measure of education with
measures of experience in a wage equation.  Income and substitution effects in female labor supply
should differ in the presence of young children, so that estimating them requires interacting indicator
variables for family structure with measures of wage rates and other family income in equations
describing women’s labor-force participation and hours of work.
In these and many other cases our theory indicates that we should reestimate (3) as:
(4) Yi t = "Xi t + $Xi tZi t + ,i t .
This approach is dangerous and wrong, for it restricts MY/MZ to operate only through X .  No matter
how tightly held is the belief that the interaction is important, one must estimate the equation as:
(5) Yi t = "Xi t + $Xi tZi t + (Zi t + ,i t .
Main effects must be present for every variable included in interaction terms.  If a rigorously derived
prediction implies only an interaction, at the very least one must test the main effect.
6  Interactions
should also be included with all terms that make up a nonlinear main effect, not merely with the linear
term.
7
To understand the pitfalls of mistakenly estimating (4), consider the equation presented in Part
II of Table 1 that related men’s wages to indicators of their looks.  A reasonable hypothesis is that
employers pay attention to looks when hiring new workers, but that the effect of beauty diminishes11
as workers acquire firm-specific experience and are increasingly rewarded for their skills rather than
their ascriptive characteristics.
8  In this data set 22 percent of the sample has more than 10 years of
job tenure, with the rest described by indicator variables for less than 1 year, 1-3 years, or 3-10 years
of tenure in the firm.  The equation underlying Part II of Table 1 included these three indicator
variables as the vector X.  The two indicators for looks make up Z.
The estimates in the first column of Table 2 show what happens when we mistakenly exclude
the main effect for Z.  There is a negative wage penalty for bad looks, all else equal, but we would
interpret it as existing only among workers who have been on the job fewer than 10 years.  The
results would thus confirm the hypothesis that led us to include the interactions.  In fact, this finding
and the hypothesis are quite wrong:  When the correct equation (5) is estimated, the results in the
second column of Table 2 show that there is no significant interaction of looks and job tenure.  The
estimates of $ in (4) mistakenly attributed the effect of beauty on wages to the interaction of beauty
with job tenure.
Failure to include main effects for all interactions is happily fairly uncommon in published
work.
9  Much more common is the specification:
Yi t = "Xi t + $Z1i tZ2i t + ,i t .
In the recent literature Z1 has been the coverage of the minimum wage, the amount of unemployment
insurance benefits a worker receives, or a geographic indicator.  Z2 has correspondingly been the
level of the minimum wage relative to some average wage, the inverse of the worker’s wage, or an
indicator for the presence of some law.  In all of these cases the researcher cannot infer from the $ ^
whether Z1 or Z2 is generating the effect on Y.  Good econometric practice suggests that the12
equation should be estimated with main effects of Z1 and Z2 as well as the interaction, and the results
should at least be in a footnote.
A related issue occurs in the extremely common case when one includes higher-order terms
in some of the variables in X in (3), either because the theory leads us to expect a nonlinear relation,
or simply because we wish to test for one.  If, for example, one includes terms such as "1Xi t + "2X
2
i t in (3), it is essential to calculate MY/MX = "1 + 2"2X and to discuss the direction, size and
significance of the relation between Y and X at various values of X, particularly at its mean.
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Similarly, in the case of interactions and nonlinear terms, having estimated the correct equation (5)
one must present, or at least discuss, estimates of  MY/MX and MY/MZ at various values of X and Z,
as well as their standard errors calculated based on the variances and covariances of the parameter
estimates.  In that way one can infer the mean effect as well as the impacts of X and Z on Y over their
ranges.
IV.  Experiments and Instruments — Circumventing Endogeneity?
Since the development of modern econometrics we have been concerned with possible
violations of the assumption of the Gauss-Markov theorem that E(X,) = 0.  From the 1940s through
the 1960s that concern led to intense concentration on developing the simultaneous-equation
methods, beginning with instrumental variables techniques, that are familiar now to all first-year
econometrics students.  One might interpret the growth of time-series econometrics in the 1970s and
1980s, particularly the attention to inferring causality in time-series models, as resulting from the
same concern.  In the 1990s labor economists played a pioneering role in research addressing this
concern, and a huge amount of attention was devoted to attempts to account for causality in
labormetric relationships.13
A few examples are useful in motivating recent concerns.  One of the staples of labormetrics
is:
(6) log(Wi) = "EDi + $Xi + ,i ,
where W is worker i’s wage rate or earnings, ED is her education, and X is a (large) vector of her
characteristics.  One wishes to identify " ^ as the rate of return to marginal investments in schooling
by a randomly chosen member of the population.  The agents’ behavior confounds the estimate in a
variety of ways, including nonrandomness induced by differential access to funds for additional
schooling, by intergenerational and other transmission of tastes for additional schooling and of
unmeasured productivity-augmenting factors, and others.  The trick is to purge the estimates of these
factors so as to infer how additional schooling would raise earnings (and presumably productivity).
Another example is the problem of inferring the demand for labor L from equations such as:
(7) Li t = -"Wi t + $Xi t + ,i t ,
where X here is a vector of variables describing other factors that shock the labor demand of firms
i.  The difficulty is the standard one of identifying shifts in supply so that we can treat " ^ as the slope
of the labor-demand curve.
One line of proposed solutions to this type of simultaneity problem in labor economics has
been what their proponents call “natural experiments.”  Some event occurs between times t=1 and
t=2 that shifts the RHS variable of interest.  By calculating Yi 2 - Yi 1 , where Y is the dependent
variable of interest and i are observations where the shock occurred, one can infer the impact of the
shock to the variable that we wish to treat as exogenous, provided nothing else shifted Y on the time
interval [1,2].  The common way of conditioning on other determinants of Y is to identify a set of
observations j where the shock did not occur, but where the X can either also be measured, or, more14
commonly, assumed to have changed identically and have the same marginal impacts on Y as in
observations i, so that the double-difference )
2 = [Yi 2 - Yi 1] - [Yj 2 - Yj 1] can be calculated as an
unbiased estimate of the effect of the exogenous shift in the RHS variable.
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The most obvious difficulty with this approach is that )
2 alone may not control for the
changes in Yi that occurred during this interval.  This problem is hardly unique to the natural
experiment approach; but that approach has generated a novel solution, namely finding additional
observations i’ similar to i but unaffected by the “experiment,” and others j’ similar to j, and
calculating the triple-difference:
(8)  )
3 = {[Yi 2 - Yi 1] - [Yj 2 - Yj 1]} - {[Yi’ 2 - Yi’ 1] - [Yj’ 2 - Yj’ 1]} . 
In one example Hamermesh and Trejo (1997) attempt to infer the impact of a rise in the penalty on
overtime work by identifying a change in California in 1980 that extended to male workers a daily
penalty that had applied to women only, letting i be males and j be females in California, and letting
the (‘) be observations outside California.  Even this approach ignores the strong possibility that other
variables that affect the Y have changed differentially over time across areas.  An essential extension,
given the difficulty of claiming that groups j, i’ and j’ are otherwise identical to group i, is thus to
replace the Yk t  in (8), or in the calculation of )
2, by E(Yk t *Xk t), conditioning on as many
theoretically-based components of X in i and j (and i’ and j’) as are available in the data at hand.
From this perspective double- and triple-differencing without additional conditioning variables should
be viewed as a last resort when information on the components of X is absent.
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An important issue is whether the observations Yi 1 and Yi 2 measure the outcome before and
after the shock occurred.  Is t=1 sufficiently distant from the shock that agents had not yet begun
adjusting to an event that may have been partly expected?  Obversely, if one is interested in long-run15
impacts of the change (which is what most of our theories discuss), is t=2 sufficiently long after the
shock that agents have made all the adjustments to the shock?  Answering these questions requires
the researcher to think about agents’ behavior.  The difficulty with lengthening the real time between
t=1 and t=2 is that other factors that are unaccounted for but that affect )
2 (or )
3) are increasingly
likely to have changed.
There is probably no problem with t=1 (1980) in Klerman and Leibowitz’s (1997) study of
the impact of state maternity leave laws passed in the late 1980s; but t=2 is 1990, making it highly
unlikely that agents had sufficient time to adjust their fertility and labor supply to the new choice sets
facing them.  The opposite potential problem arises in Hamermesh and Trejo (1997):  t=2 (1985) is
sufficiently long after the effective date of the change to have allowed adjustments in the input of
overtime hours; but t=1 was 1973, by which time agents may have begun adjusting their input
demands in reaction to the already widespread discussion of extending the overtime penalty (even
though the actual extension did not occur until 1980).  That this timing problem generates difficulties
is shown by the effect on the estimates if we let t=1 be 1978 instead of the more appropriate 1973:
The impact of the shock on the fraction of male workers putting in more than 8 hours per day drops
from -0.052 to -0.022; that on the fraction working exactly 8 hours drops from 0.077 to 0.024, and
that on average overtime hours drops from -0.206 to -0.135.  In this example, and I believe typically,
observing at t=1 too close to the event biases its estimated impact toward zero.  A good way of
circumventing the problems associated with the choices of t=1 and t=2 is to use as many values for
each as the data will allow.
The most difficult issue is whether the change that is supposed to identify the effect of the
RHS variable of interest is truly exogenous.  One must be able to argue that its timing and size are16
independent of the past history of Yi (which is likely to be correlated with Yi 1); otherwise, Yi 1 is
correlated with the magnitude of the shock, and the approach has not solved the exogeneity problem.
The best claim for exogeneity can be made for “acts of God” or acts originating outside the economy
being evaluated and unaffected by events in it.   Some studies of the impact of migration (to the
United States from Cuba, Card 1990; and to France from Algeria, Hunt 1992) are cases where claims
of exogeneity can be fairly convincing.  Except where legal changes are imposed on many subunits
by a higher level of government, however, treating them as exogenous is much less convincing.
The “natural-experiment” approach is hardly a panacea for circumventing endogeneity.  The
user of this approach should make every effort to obtain data on as many X variables as possible, to
observe the Y sufficiently before and after the “experiment” and to be convincing that the
“experiment” represents an exogenous shock.  A healthy skepticism about the potential for success
along all of these dimensions is in order.
The other recently revived approach to endogeneity in labor economics is similar, but relies
instead on finding clever instrumental variables that meet the criteria that they are correlated with the
shocking variable of interest (ED in (6), W in (7)) but uncorrelated with the error term.  Much of the
focus has been on measuring the returns to schooling (essentially " in (6)), with instruments chosen
being such items as date of birth, because compulsory schooling requirements have cut-off dates that
impose exogenous and discrete constraints on schooling decisions (Angrist and Krueger 1991);
siblings’ sex composition, because it affects women’s schooling and may not be related to earnings
except through schooling (Butcher and Case 1994); and smoking, because it may reflect individuals’
discount rates but be unrelated to access to funds for schooling (Evans and Montgomery 1994).17
These innovations have a surface appeal; but, as with the earlier literature on instrumental
variables, their validity in part rests on whether the instrument explains much of the variation in the
supposed endogenous variables.  Bound et al (1995) cover this very well in the context of using birth
date as an instrument for education, and they illustrate clearly the problems that arise when the
instrument’s correlation with the variable for which it is instrumenting is low.  It also rests on whether
behavior adapts to them in such a way as to render the instrument’s exogeneity suspect.  The new
literature is often more precise than it predecessors in thinking about the conditions for identification,
but proponents of searching for instruments are often too quick to assume that the chosen instrument
is exogenous.  In the case of date of birth, for example, parents can choose whether to “hold back”
from starting school a child whose birthday barely makes the starting deadline.  A different mix of
offspring leads parents to change the amount of pre-school time they spend with daughters, thus
affecting subsequent wages and rendering the instrument’s exogeneity to the schooling decision
questionable.  Substantial evidence indicates a positive intergenerational correlation of smoking;
coupled with the negative relationship between wealth and smoking, a youth’s smoking is thus not
a proper instrument for his education.  As with the natural-experiment approach, one must in the end
be able to argue that the instrument itself is beyond the decision-makers’ control, that it describes
behavior that is randomly distributed in the population one wishes to describe, and that the
environment in which the outcome arises does not affect the RHS variable through their behavior.
V.  Selected Unobservables and Not-So-Fixed Effects
Since the late 1970s two economic/technical issues have captivated labormetricians, sample
selectivity and the importance of unit-specific effects.  These two are related in that both deal in some
way with problems generated by behavioral effects in our main relations (equations (3)) that produce18
subtle biases in the estimates of the " on the X variable(s) of interest.  Selectivity problems arise
because we believe that there are unobserved correlates of Y that bias the " because they determine
whether a data point is included in the sample.  Problems with individual effects result from our
beliefs that a bias is induced because unobservables are correlated with both Y and X.  These are
powerful ideas that have led some of the best minds in econometrics to generate solutions that
account for them.  By the early 1990s canned statistical packages enabled labormetricians to apply
these solutions to their own research problems at very low cost.
Consider first the selectivity issue.  The classic selectivity problem (implied by Gronau 1974,
analyzed and solved by Heckman 1976) consists of the model:
(9) Y1i t = "Xi t + $Y2i t + ,i t , observed if:
(10) Y2i t$ (Zi t + <i t ,
where the Yk are endogenous variables, the " and $ are parameters and the , and < are error terms.
The example that generated the initial interest in this problem, the unobservability of the wages (Y2)
of nonparticipants in the labor force who are thus excluded from estimates of the effect of wages on
hours of work (Y1) in (9), had a very clear economic interpretation, with the variables in Z
representing the value of time in the home, those in X representing the nonwage variables that shift
labor supply.
The solution (the so-called Heckman correction) has been applied repeatedly and increasingly,
as a perusal of recent issues of labor journals or major general journals shows.
13  These applications
have a severe problem that should stand as a warning to those tempted by the presence of an easily
available computer routine.  Unless there are several observable variables that can be rationalized as
belonging in Z but not in X and that vary independently of X, the inverse Mills’ ratio included in the19
estimation of (9) is essentially a nonlinear function of the variables in X.  The user of this correction
should present a good rationalization for excluding the Z from (9) and the X from (10), and should
either present estimates of (9) with and without this correction or report in a footnote that the other
approach yielded different (or similar) estimates of the crucial parameters in " and $.  
Finding that the selectivity term is insignificant in (9) may be evidence that the model is
underidentified, not that selectivity is unimportant.  Even if the correction “matters,” one must have
an economic theory justifying (9) and thus the inclusion of a selectivity correction.  Some uses of the
correction rest on the mere fact that observations are excluded; others rely on the faith that the user’s
problem is the same as the original motivation for the technique, even though the new problem often
lacks the sound microtheoretic basis of the original problem.  Without an explicit justification for the
auxiliary equation, it is not clear that the correction will improve estimates of the " and $.
The typical individual-effects model specifies a time-invariant unobservable Ni that affects and
is correlated with Yi t:
(11) Yi t = "Xi t + Ni + ,i t .
Greater availability of longitudinal data sets has enabled labormetricians to use indicator variables for
each observation i in the panel to remove these unobservables and thus free the estimated " from
potential contamination from them.  As with selectivity corrections, randomly chosen volumes of
journals specializing in labor economics yield many applications of this technique.
14  The assumption
that all the individual-specific variation not captured by the variables in X arises from the
unobservable is implicit in these applications, while assuming that the unobservable is unchanging
over time (is fixed) is explicit.20
The former assumption generates a problem if most of the variation in the X of interest is
cross-sectional (if the X are highly autocorrelated), since applying the fixed-effects estimator then
removes that variation.
15  Not surprisingly, the approach then generates estimates of " that are very
close to zero.  Consider estimating an equation describing the (logarithm of) real compensation
received by a balanced panel of 100 full professors of economics at six major American public
universities observed in 1979-80 and 1985-86 (Hamermesh 1989).  The least-squares estimates of
the coefficients of a quadratic on recent citations by others, and on prior administrative experience,
are shown in column (1) of Table 3.  The estimates range from twice to three times the size of the
fixed-effects estimates shown in column (2).
16  The attenuated estimates reflect the mistaken equation
of the persistent impact of citations on salaries to unobservables that we cannot identify.  In general
there is no way of dealing with this issue; but this technique is best suited to cases where the intraunit
autocorrelation in X is low relative to the cross-section variation.  A good check on the technique is
thus to decompose the variance in each X in the hope that relatively little is due to individual or time-
specific effects.
The assumption that the unobservables are time-invariant is extremely difficult to credit.
(After all, if the variables that we do observe vary over time, why shouldn’t those that we cannot
observe?)  The classic example is the exclusion of unmeasured ability in an equation explaining wages.
Even there, while ability may be time-invariant, its interaction with other characteristics may change
with time.  One partial solution if T>2 is to include individual-specific time trends as well as both
individual and time effects.  Even that solution, however, may moderate but fail to vitiate the
problem, since individual trends impose a particularly rigid structure on the nature of the time-series
changes in the individual effects.  There is no “quick-fix” econometric solution; all one can do is21
recognize the nature of the problem, find more variables to include in X, and have a good economic
justification for including the individual effect even when substantial cross-section variation is
captured in X.
VI.  Time-Series Analysis in Labormetrics -- Gone, Forgotten, but Perhaps Not Dead
Of the 28 empirical studies in labor economics published in the American Economic Review
during 1967-72, 57 percent were based on time series with T>10.  Of the 24 published there during
1992-96, a significantly lower percentage, 33, were so based.  Obviously this is a nonrandom survey,
but it confirms impressions that labor economists have shifted their interest away from data sets with
small N and relatively large T.  Partly this may arise from rational behavior on the part of
labormetricians, who are responding to the increased abundance and ease of access to micro-based
cross-sectional and short longitudinal data sets.
Part of the shift may also stem from increased concerns about how much we can learn about
behavior using typically available time series.  There are two problems.  The time series may be
aggregates of units i to the point that they are incapable of reflecting the structure of the
microeconomic behavior that we are trying to examine.   This is an increasing problem as the
specifications suggested by theory lead beyond easily aggregated linear approximations to general
functions that are difficult to aggregate.  The second potential difficulty is our new awareness that
modern time-series analysis imposes integrating and cointegrating restrictions on the variables and
their relationships that make it harder to believe that the time-series labormetrics of the 1950s through
1970s can be informative.
Is time-series labormetrics dead, or merely moribund?  I hope it is the latter, because there
are questions that are inherently answered only by examining time-series variation.  How workers22
respond to transitory shocks to opportunities is best studied by examining patterns of earnings, wage
rates and hours at the individual level using fairly long time series.  Similarly, studying the dynamics
of labor demand inherently requires analyzing frequently observed and long time series in order to
obtain sufficient information on temporal patterns of firm-specific shocks to allow us to separate out
general patterns of dynamics from idiosyncratic behavior (e.g. Caballero et al 1997).
With the growth of long annual sets of data on households in several countries, and the
possibility of studying relatively long time series on firms’ employment, investment and other
characteristics, labormetricians will have to pay more attention to time-series econometrics.  Of
course these are panels, and the panel-data methods that today’s graduate students in labor economics
learn are relevant; but to the extent that we wish to study dynamics in these data, we should be paying
attention to the statistical properties of the time-series relationships among them and applying the
techniques that our colleagues in macroeconomics and finance have developed for these purposes.
This requires us to think about problems of causality and of stationarity in time-series estimation and
to learn (the strengths and weaknesses of) the techniques that time-series econometricians have
developed during the decades that it has increasingly escaped our attention.
VII.  Applying the “Sniff Test”
The previous sections have dealt with a variety of issues in applying econometric technique
in situations that labormetricians confront.  In this and the next section I depart from this focus to
examine issues that are less technical, but no less important.  Here I consider how to test estimates
for their reasonableness and how to avoid creating situations that might generate unreasonable results.
The next section considers how to present results so as to make them comprehensible to the reader.23
Throughout our own empirical research and the evaluation of others’ we should think whether
the research meets “the sniff test”:  Does it make economic sense, or does the analysis simply reflect
our enchantment with some new technique that we have created or happened upon, our delight at
some surprising result, or our infatuation with a new set of data?  In evaluating the innovation of a
piece of empirical work a useful approach is to ask oneself whether, if the result were carefully
explained to a thoughtful layperson, that listener could avoid laughing.  A good inoculation against
laughter is to make sure that the empirical work is grounded in economic theory.
One way of applying the sniff test in studies of the impact of labor-market policies is to bound
the economic effects.  This can, for example, be done by comparing their implications to the sizes of
the programs under study.  For example, Parsons (1980) generated cross-section estimates of the
impact of U.S. Disability Insurance on the labor-force participation of older men and used them to
simulate the impact of actual time-series changes in those benefits.  He showed that they fully
accounted for the decline in participation that occurred from 1955 to 1976.  The implied growth in
the number of men receiving Disability Insurance benefits over that period was less than that in
nonparticipation, so that readers might question the validity of the cross-section estimates of the
elasticities.
17  A similar problem arises in a large international time-series literature from the 1970s
that related higher unemployment benefits to changing aggregate unemployment rates.  Many of those
studies (e.g., Grubel and Maki 1976) imply that a 10-percentage-point decrease in replacement rates,
well within the range of policy choices, would reduce the unemployment rate below zero!  Robert
Moffitt’s (1997) demonstration that a recent estimate of the extent of consumption smoothing
produced by transfer programs is far too high to be consistent with the sizes of the programs and their
other impacts is a good application of the sniff test.  At the very least, in evaluating studies of the24
impact of a policy one must simulate reasonable changes in it to see if the estimated impacts on the
outcome of interest are absurd.
Another sniff test applicable in studying a labor-market policy or institution is to use the
estimates of its impact to infer the behavioral parameters that are generating them.  Estimates of the
employment effects of a higher minimum wage, for example, should be linked to the interaction of
the relative size of the low-wage work force whose wages are affected and the demand elasticity for
low-wage workers.  Changes in hours of work induced by changing requirements on the overtime
penalty can be converted to labor-demand elasticities and compared to elasticities that have been
directly estimated in other studies (Hamermesh and Trejo 1997).  The estimated impact on
employment fluctuations of experience-rated taxes to finance unemployment insurance yields
estimates of the relative sizes of the costs of adjusting employment across industries (Anderson 1993)
that should accord with our notions of interindustry differences in relative hiring and firing costs.
Estimates of the impact of the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit (essentially an income-tax rebate for
low-wage workers based on their earnings) on hours and participation imply supply elasticities that
can be compared to those generated in the huge literature that estimates them directly (Eissa and
Liebman 1996).
Our data usually come ready-made, which makes our life much easier; but they reflect
observations aggregated temporally over intervals that may fail to mirror the frequency of the
decisions generating the behavior that we wish to examine.  This difficulty means, for example, that
studies that attempt to infer the dynamics of some economic process will generate estimates that,
while plausible, have nothing to do with the underlying behavior.  For example, in the 1990s a
laudable innovation in studying employment dynamics has been the use of panel data on firms.25
Unfortunately, while substantial evidence based on industry and other more aggregated data suggests
that employment dynamics are fairly rapid, most of these micro panels contain only annual data and
are thus incapable of identifying the temporal path of adjustment of employment in response to
shocks.
Leamer (1978) made a major contribution to methodology with his critique of what he
believed was the common practice of reporting the last of a long line of results one had produced in
a research project (optionally stopping when the results were deemed satisfactory, presumably when
they rejected the desired null hypothesis).  For a variety of reasons the “fishing expeditions” -- the
specification searches -- that Leamer deplored are likely to have become less important in labor
economics after the late 1970s.  Because of the large individual variation in outcomes, including
additional ancillary variables in our equations in the hopes of altering the estimated impacts of the
variables of interest is less worthwhile with the micro data that we increasingly use.  Also, the size
of the micro data sets generally means that adding a variable that we think might be important for
some sample respondents is not likely to affect behavior inferred over most of the sample.  Finally,
one can hope that the development of economic theory and prior empirical work has improved
labormetricians’ ability to specify the other variables that form the controls that allow us to study the
particular novelty of interest.
Old-fashioned fishing is much rarer now, although people still present the results of equations
reestimated after deleting all variables whose coefficients did not achieve some desired significance
level in earlier specifications.
18  The low cost of applying ever-more sophisticated techniques and the
professional returns to that activity have, however, led us instead to hope that what is not readily
visible in the data might stand out if kernel estimation or competing-risks hazard models are applied,26
or if some (usually unspecified) heterogeneity can be accounted for.  Technique search has replaced
specification search as the fishing tackle of choice.  These and other sophisticated techniques should
be used if the underlying theory warrants it or if the data are obviously analyzed best by them, but not
as the rationalization for a fishing expedition.  Even in those cases the careful labormetrician is
obligated to examine first whether the relationships of interest are apparent in cross-tabulations or
perhaps in simple regressions.  If they do not exist there in large sets of micro data, the sophisticated
techniques required to elicit them may very well be generating inappropriate inferences.
Perhaps the best way to avoid all the pitfalls mentioned here is to base one’s claims on several
independent sets of data (ideally covering different geographical units -- hopefully with different
institutional structures -- from different countries, different time periods, or even different phenomena
illustrating the general issue being analyzed).  There is little or no reward to replication in
labormetrics; but the credibility of a new finding that is based on carefully analyzing two data sets is
far more than twice that of a result based only on one.  This multiplied credit makes sense, for, as
Milton Friedman noted:
“I have long had relatively little faith in judging statistical results by formal tests of
statistical significance.  I believe that it is much more important to base conclusions
on a wide range of evidence coming from different sources over a long period of time.
[1987, quoted in Hammond (1996, p. 202)]
VIII.  Presenting Results -- Light Out from Under a Bushel
In presenting the results of our research, searching for statistical significance -- “95-percent
confidence interval fetishism,” should not be our goal.
19  Even if our test is powerful and generates
significant results, to be interesting the estimates must be discussed from the viewpoint of whether
or not they are economically important (McCloskey and Ziliak 1996).   A large effect, albeit one that27
is statistically insignificantly different from zero, still tells us that the best estimate is that the impact
on behavior is economically significant.  This approach has the additional virtue of tying the
presentation of our results to a sniff test -- it requires us to focus on whether the results make
economic sense, not merely whether they pass muster statistically.
The majority of labormetric results are likely to be shown in tabular form.  The questions are:
Which results, and how to present them?  Constraints on journal space and the proliferation of
coefficients have increasingly led authors to include in their tables only the parameter estimates of
central interest.  This is a welcome trend -- acknowledgment in a footnote that large vectors of other
variables were included usually suffices.  Tables that run over a page almost always contain
information that is at best secondary to the author’s main point.  If some standard variable does
generate unusual estimates, the anomaly is worth reporting.  Even better, it should alert the author
before publication that something may be severely wrong with the underlying data or specification.
Most of our raw data contain three or occasionally four digits.  To report six-digit parameter
estimates is thus silly -- three significant digits (after zeros) are the most that one can meaningfully
discuss.  When the first significant digit is the fourth after the decimal point, one simple way to save
space and avoid inducing blindness in the reader is to redefine the variable so that the estimate rises
by several orders of magnitude (e.g., Citations
2/100 in Table 3).  One should not report a coefficient,
standard error or p-value as being, for example, .000 (especially since no standard error or p-value
could ever be zero).
Whether one is presenting the impact of indicator variables or others, the reader should be
able to tell what the variable is.  Too many authors list variable names in mnemonic form (and too
many journals indulge this bad habit).  Even if the variables are defined elsewhere in the study, no28
reader should be required to search back repeatedly through the paper or to memorize their
definitions.  The variables should be referred to clearly in each table where estimates relating them
to the dependent variable are presented.
Often the parameter estimates that are presented in labormetric publications have little or no
intuitive economic meaning of their own.  This includes parameters from probit or ordered probit
models, estimates of structural parameters in systems of demand equations or cost/production
tableaux, and others.  Authors serve themselves and their readers far better by presenting
economically interesting transformations of the parameter estimates.  Thus rather than presenting
probit parameters associated with some variable X, better to present an estimate of MPr{Y=1}/MX.
With ordered probits (so long as the number of categories is small), better to present the effects of
a one-unit increase from the mean of X on the probability of Y being in each category.  Similar good
sense should apply in presenting results based on other techniques.  With LS estimates, unless the
variables are in logarithms the reader should be given means of the crucial variables in order to use
the parameter estimates to compute elasticities.
Many authors still insist, and many journals still allow them to present parameter estimates
with sequences of asterisks, daggers, crosses, crosses of Lorraine, and the like to denote significance
levels.  Where the test being applied is unfamiliar this makes sense; but where, as in most cases, these
marks annotate t-statistics or standard errors describing regression-type parameters, they are quite
superfluous:  I am sure that readers of labormetric articles know the significance tables for the
distribution of Student’s t.  Reasonable people may differ about whether presenting t-statistics or
standard errors is more useful, but I prefer standard errors.  Most readers can divide by 2 (or 1.64,
or 1.28) to obtain significance levels; standard errors facilitate making cross-equation comparisons,29
calculating the partial effects of combinations of the variables or testing pairwise constraints on the
variables (with assumptions about the estimated covariances); and the null hypothesis is not always
that the parameter equals zero.
We often list estimates of parameters relating each of a vector of indicator variables X to Y,
with one of the components of X arbitrarily excluded.  The reader can interpret results more easily
if the parameter estimates are all of one sign, so that the estimates should be recomputed before
publication to achieve this end.  Indeed, except where there is some natural order to the categories
(as with years of job tenure in Table 2, but not with occupation or industry) listing the categories in
the order of the indicators’ effects on Y facilitates interpretation.
We should always aim to present our findings in such a way as to provide the clearest and
strongest impression of what we have discovered.  Labormetricians have always published their
results (and sometimes their data too) in tabular form.  Since the late 1980s, however, there has been
a boom in presenting both using graphics.
20  No doubt this arose from the easy access to computer
graphics in spreadsheet and statistical programs on personal computers and the ability of high-
resolution personal printers to reproduce the figures.  When should one follow this trend and use
graphics instead of tabular presentation?
A simple answer is to read Tufte (1983) and follow its guidelines.  Specifically, the increased
ease of using graphical presentations has occurred simultaneously with the expansion of our ability
to generate masses of results on relationships in large data sets.  Thus in many cases where we would
heretofore have had to present long, repetitious tables listing numerous parameter estimates whose
particular values are not crucial to our conclusions, today we can present them more succinctly and
more potently graphically.  For example, the results of estimating hazards are almost always much30
more clearly presented as graphs.  As a related example, consider Figure 1 (taken from Hamermesh
1999), which shows estimates of the double-differences between the fraction of work done at each
particular hour of the day by men in the top quartile of the earnings distribution and those in the
bottom, comparing 1991 to 1973.  The estimates could have been tabulated as 24 double-differences
with the associated standard errors.  I am convinced that the graph illustrates much more clearly the
salient result, that the burden of evening and night work shifted toward the bottom of the earnings
distribution, while day work shifted toward the top.
As with our increasingly accessible high-powered econometric tools, our increased graphics
capabilities have led to misapplications.  One should follow Tufte’s dicta:   1) Avoid graphs depicting
one or two time series, since they are visually boring and their content can be presented more
concisely verbally; and 2) Do not create graphs that are so cluttered with written descriptions as to
obfuscate the message of the data.  The technology has also led to overkill.  If, for example, we
estimate some time-series pattern for each of a large number of industries, the reader need not be
assaulted with pages of graphs depicting each set of results; a few typical ones, plus a footnote
referring to the others, suffice.  Similarly, repetition of graphics showing the results of simulations
describing how one’s results would be altered by a large variety of small changes in policy parameters
has remarkably soporific effects that detract from the message of one’s results.  31
IX.  Conclusion -- A Warning About Wizardry
In 1978 I was studying the relationship between unemployment insurance benefits and
retirement behavior.  The crucial variable provided information on whether the individual was fully-
retired, partly-retired or working.  Due to the unavailability of statistical packages my research
assistant and I spent substantial effort modifying a program to enable me to estimate the appropriate
multinomial logit.  In 1994 an article of mine was returned favorably from a major general journal,
but with the admonition that I should replace the ordered-probit estimation of educational attainment
(which the data classified into intervals) by least squares.  I complied with the request.
In both cases I was wrong.  Spending so much effort on what was for the 1970s sophisticated
econometric wizardry was a poor way to allocate time for someone who is basically an economist.
No reasonable person could have expected that using the more esoteric technique would produce
much different results from those generated by simpler techniques, and my time would have been
better spent trying to understand the economics of the behavior I was studying.  Obversely,
complying with the editor’s request in 1994 represented a step backward from the frontier of
knowledge and detracted from the story that the article had to tell.  By the late 1990s the plethora
of accessible statistical packages made it easy to use such techniques; and expunging results was
foolish in the light of most readers’ fluency with them.
The moral is clear:  Apply a benefit-cost calculation to the use of econometric technique.
Labormetric research is not a cadenza designed to show off the sophistication of our tools.  Its sole
purpose should be to provide an empirical description of labor-market outcomes that helps to
illuminate general economic behavior.  Sophisticated techniques can enhance description and shed
additional light on behavior;  but they should be pursued only to the point where their time cost does32
not detract from improving the research along the margins of enhancing the quality of the underlying
data and of thinking about the economic relationships that generate the outcomes.   Even before we
resort to wizardry we should assure ourselves that we are not confusing things by making mistakes
with simpler techniques.  And, since the sophisticated technique is too often the attraction in its own
right, we should make very sure that it is apropos the research question we are studying.33
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Resources, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring), pp. 388-412.Table 1.  LS and LAD Estimates from Four Data Sets
 Dep. Var.:  Coefficient
(Mean; s.d.)  (Std. error)
(Min; max) LS LAD
I.  Salaries of full professors in public-university
     economics departments, effect of reputational 96274;       8949 -662 -626
     ranking (1 is highest), N = 17: 80512;   115021 (187) (315)
II.  Ln(Hourly Earnings), Quality of Employment 1.83;       .48
       Survey 1977, 700 men, effect relative to average       .05;     3.24
       of:  Below-average looks               -.164 -.171
(.046) (.055)
  Above-average looks    .016  .010
(.033) (.040)
III.  Weekly minutes sleeping, resting and napping,
       Time Use Survey, 1975-76, effect of minutes  3383;       499 -.199 -.182
       of work, N = 706:    1335;      6110 (.020) (.028)
IV.  Ln(1+Estate), wealthy decedents, Connecticut,  12.23;       1.88
        1939-76, N=149, effect of:                        7.15;     17.34
         Expected Longevity         .160  .154
           (.033) (.031)
        Unexpected Years of Life  -.015 -.006
(.020) (.018)Table 2.  The Impact of Looks on Men’s Earnings Moderated Through Job Tenure, QES 1977
a
Variable:   (4)  (5)
Below-average looks ------ -.168
(.079)
Below-average looks and:
Tenure <1  -.159  .009
(.101) (.129)
Tenure 1-3 -.137  .030
(.100) (.127)
Tenure 3-10 -.193 -.026
(.093) (.122)
Above-average looks ------ -.001
(.064)
Above-average looks and:
Tenure <1  -.008 -.006
(.074) (.094)
Tenure 1-3 -.006 -.005
(.074) (.098)
Tenure 3-10  .069  .071
(.063) (.090)
                                                                                                                                                                  
aEach equation also contains the three main effects of the tenure indicators and a large number of other
controls, including age-schooling-6 and its square.Table 3.  The Impact of Citations on Real Compensation, 100 Full Professors in 1979-80 and 1985-86
a
Variable:           Pooled LS  Fixed Effects
Citations (t-1,...,t-5)  .00482       .00245    
(.00063)    (.00096)
Citations
2/100 -.00138    -.00041 
(.00033)  (.00032)
Administrator  .1270        .0745         
(.0244)    (.0369)  
                                                                                                                                                                  
      
aEach equation also contains a quadratic in experience (years since Ph.D.), and the LS equation contains the
time-invariant indicator variable, theorist.1  In the latter case successive moves from the simplest wage measure to closer approximations to
the marginal labor cost affect the parameter estimates in sensible ways (Hamermesh 1983).
2  In most states at that time unemployed workers could receive up to 26 weeks of benefits, and $84
was a typical weekly benefit amount.
3  Even checking the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest may not suffice:  One must go
behind them to consider other characteristics of the underlying observations.  In some recent work
I was constructing data on couples from CPS samples  from various years in the 1970s.  Although
I wanted husband-wife couples only, an examination of the sex and family status of respondents
showed that roughly 0.6 percent of the households consisted of one head and two spouses, or two
heads and two spouses.  An examination of state of residence showed that only 6 percent lived in
states with a high concentration of Mormons; and it is hard to believe there was that much communal
living, even in the 1970s.  I deleted all these observations from the sample.
4  This is an average of the 1992 National Research Council rating, which is probably in part
retrospective, and the rankings of the departments based on pages published during 1990-94 in
leading economics journals from Dusansky and Vernon (1998).  A lower number denotes a higher
ranking.
5 A very careful comparison using all these approaches is provided by Anderson and Meyer (1999).
6  This is not always done, e.g., Voos and Mishel (1986).  In one equation in which the union status
of a firm  and the concentration ratio in its market are included as main effects, the former produces
a negative impact on supermarkets’ profits.  The authors use a second equation from which the main
effect of unionism has been deleted, but to which an interaction of union status and concentration has
been added, to infer that the negative coefficient on the interaction implies that “unions’ ... impact is
greater when local markets are less competitive.”  This conclusion is probably incorrect, and certainly
cannot be inferred from the regression on which it is based.  This error is committed, although with
much less serious consequences, in the lead article in a recent issue of the most widely read
economics journal (Genesove and Mayer 1997, Tables 5 and 7). 
7  This too is not always done, e.g., Agee and Crocker (1996, Table 2, col. 4), although in that case
a comparison of the interactions with the linear term when no quadratic main effects are included
suggests the failure has only a minor impact.  
8  One might reasonably argue, however, that beauty is a proxy for such skills as the ability to inspire
other workers and to induce cooperation, so that it is productive even for long-tenure workers.
9  I did, however, find three instances just by perusing the most recent four years of issues of a leading
labor journal.
10  For example, in an otherwise clever and useful study Whittington and Alm (1997, Tables 2 and 5)
find significant positive "1 and negative "2 relating the probability of divorce to education.  They
state, based on the estimate of "1, that education raises the probability of divorce.  In fact, at the mean
FOOTNOTESeducation the effect is in most cases small and negative, and it is probably (because one cannot
calculate the standard error of MY/ MX without Cov("1"2), which is not published) insignificant.
11  In its simplest form this approach is, of course, the same as the intercity method of inferring the
effect of unions on relative wages that was used by Gregg Lewis’s students in a number of masters
and doctoral dissertations completed in the 1940s and 1950s (discussed by Lewis 1963).
12  Conditioning on a vector of X variables is not an admission that one has failed to select the proper
control group (despite Meyer 1995).  We are never studying laboratory experiments, so that other
things may very well change differentially.  At the very worst, only in the highly unlikely event that
one has chosen a control group perfectly and has reproduced laboratory conditions will conditioning
on the X will be nugatory.
13  One recent year’s editions of the Journal of Labor Economics and the Journal of Human Resources
contained seven articles that employed this technique.
14  The use of individual-effects estimators is less frequent than selectivity corrections: Recent
volumes of the Industrial and Labor Relations Review, the Journal of Labor Economics and the
Journal of Human Resources typically contain one or two articles per year using these techniques.
15  The problem is insurmountable when the variable of interest in X takes a unique value for each unit
(or group of units) i, for example, when one appends values for geographic units to observations on
individuals and wishes to hold other geographic variation constant (e.g., Ahituv et al 1996).
16  This is not a matter of measurement error.  The compensation and demographic data are from
administrative records, and the citations data are carefully collected from published volumes.  
17  The rate of nonparticipation among men 45-54 rose from 3.5 percent of the population in 1955
to 7.9 percent in 1975 (Parsons 1980, p. 132).  The percentage on DI grew from 0 to 3.9 percent
(Bound 1989, p. 483).  
18  Thomas (1997) estimates hazard rates out of unemployment in specifications from which variables
whose coefficients had t-statistics below 1.4 had been purged.  While probably not a major difficulty,
this practice does prevent the reader from inferring the impacts of the variables of interest in a fully-
specified and presumably theoretically based model.
19  I am indebted to Jeff Biddle for this term.
20  Of empirical articles in the three leading American labor journals (Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Journal of Human Resources and Journal of Labor Economics) 15 percent of the 113
published in regular issues in 1988 and 1989 included graphs of results or data.  Of the 188 published
in 1995 and 1996 34 percent included graphs.